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ABSTRACT 
In dynamic environments, competitive advantage lies in developing useful knowledge 
from continuous streams of unstructured and ambiguous data. Frontline employees 
and certain groups of customers are often the first to sense emerging issues of strate-
gic importance due to their experiential insights of the firm’s daily operations. Yet, 
they are rarely asked to provide updated information about critical issues. The present 
paper seeks to conceptually develop the notion of responsive innovation, by drawing 
on literary streams concerning collective sensing, strategic issue diagnosis and integra-
tive strategy within a micro foundations perspective. It is posited that companies 
should root their innovation processes in the collective sensing of frontline-employees 
and customers that operate around the organizational periphery. This frames the con-
cept of responsive innovation, where individuals engaged in the firm’s ongoing busi-
ness activities collectively identify issues that central managers can resolve. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In dynamic environments, strategic advantage lies in the ability of firms to be early in 
their industry to unravel evolving conditions (Ansoff, 1975, 1980; Dutton and Duncan, 
1987; Eisenhardt, 1989; Stacey, 1995; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Teece, 2007). 
Certain pockets in the strategy and innovation literatures have recognized that front-
line employees and customers operating around the organizational periphery tend to 
be at the forefront of important developments and can often sense emerging events of 
strategic importance. Yet, specific approaches for continuously aggregating and incor-
porating peripheral sensing into decision making processes have remained elusive. 
 
It has long been noted that detailed knowledge of specific operating conditions is typi-
cally held among lower-level employees (Burgelman & Grove, 1996; Dutton & Ashford, 
1993; Mintzberg, 1990a). Burgelman and Grove (1996) argue that employee behavior 
may signal strategic inflection points. Teece (2007) echoes this line of argument and 
suggests that the firm is vulnerable if the only sensing is left to a few individuals at the 
top. Building on these rationales, it has been posited that frontline employees are able 
to anticipate changes in operational capabilities that are linked with financial firm per-
formance (Andersen, 2013). In the field of innovation, von Hippel (1988, 1999, 2005) 
has similarly advocated that so-called lead users experience needs ahead of the bulk of 
the market, and Christensen et al. (2003, 2004) have suggested that certain customers 
and nonconsumers pursue developmental trajectories that end up disrupting markets. 
When combined, these studies underscore the competitive importance of peripheral 
sensing to the central strategic apex. However, a specific approach of utilizing periph-
eral sensing is needed, as well as knowledge on the relationship between these micro-
level insights and subsequent macro-level phenomena (Felin & Foss, 2006). 
 
As frontline employees and customers are in a position to sense and accumulate dis-
tinct knowledge about operational aspects of the business that will eventually influ-
ence its financial performance, they can be introduced as resources for responsive ap-
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proaches to innovation and decision making (Andersen, 2013; Burgelman & Grove, 
1996; Teece, 2007). The present paper conceptualizes this approach to innovation as 
‘responsive innovation’. Responsive innovation describes how the sensing of key 
stakeholders should be continuously aggregated to identify issues and opportunities 
which can inform managerial decisions. Hence, collective sensing of key stakeholders 
may fuel strategic issue diagnosis i.e. SID (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton, Fahey & Narayanan, 
1983; Dutton & Duncan, 1987), which holds the potential to foster innovative respons-
es. This responsive approach to innovation could help firms continuously adapt to 
markets in evolutionary states of motion.  
 
In the present paper, the concept of responsive innovation is introduced. More specifi-
cally, the paper will examine why companies should aggregate insights from key con-
stituents such as frontline employees and customers positioned around the organiza-
tional periphery, and how their ongoing collective sensing can help firms adapt to dy-
namic markets, by focusing innovative attention on strategic issues.  
 
The purpose of this conceptual paper is threefold: First, to introduce the notion of re-
sponsive innovation. Secondly, to explicate why frontline employees and customers 
operating around the organizational periphery should be at the forefront of emerging 
events, and hence, should be able to collectively sense strategic issues. Third, to expli-
cate why central management should continuously incorporate these dispersed in-
sights into strategic decision making processes to foster organizational adaptation and 
innovative responses. The remainder of the paper will explicate the background of re-
sponsive innovation, and subsequently draw up the contours of the concept. 
 
2. BACKGROUND 
Drawing links between micro and macro levels has long been problematic within social 
sciences, and the literature in strategic management is no exception (Felin & Foss, 
2006). Some of the most debated and troublesome issues in social sciences have been 
those concerning analytical levels and units of analysis. Consequently, an important 
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philosophical topic has been whether individuals (“micro”) or social collectives (“mac-
ro”) have explanatory primacy i.e. methodological individualism versus methodological 
collectivism (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Clearly, these issues are of immense importance 
for theory-building within strategic management, organizational learning and innova-
tion, and they should therefore be taken into account when establishing the concept 
of responsive innovation.  
 
Albeit substantial attention has been put on “multiple level analysis” within strategic 
management, the field has seen few efforts to reconcile micro and macro levels, or 
more generally, efforts to build micro foundations (Felin & Foss, 2006). Hence, there is 
a need for research that investigates the linkage between micro and macro levels, 
where the explanandum (that which is to be explained) is on the collective level, but 
where the explanans (that with which explanation takes place) are at the individual 
level (Felin & Foss, 2006). Utilizing sensing from key stakeholders entails interesting el-
ements related to the philosophical debate, as it focuses on micro foundations – but 
likewise investigates its implications on an aggregated level. 
 
The notion of responding to emerging events has previously been emphasized within 
certain streams of the strategy literature (Andersen, 2013; Ansoff, 1980; Dutton, Fahey 
& Narayanan, 1983; Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Mintzberg, 1990; Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 
1997). However, these literary developments have rarely (i) seen issues as innovation 
opportunities (ii) incorporated collective sensing into decision making processes (iii) 
been coupled to mechanisms that can aggregate the peripheral sensing. 
 
Hence, responsive innovation contributes to the strategy literature by providing a sys-
tematic approach for aggregating and utilizing the collective sensing of key stakehold-
ers, with the purpose of identifying strategic issues and opportunities that can foster 
innovation. Responsive innovation is defined as an organizational response capability 
where the collective sensing of key stakeholders and subsequent firm responses make 
it possible to modify business activities in ways that accommodate emerging internal 
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and external changes. As such, responsive innovation necessitates that peripheral 
sensing and central decision making are combined to form an organizational response 
capability that can foster organizational adaptation through innovative responses. 
As it can be seen in figure 1, responsive innovation is a subset of the literary stream fo-
cusing on strategic responsiveness: Hence, responsive innovation focuses on the birth 
of innovative ideas and creative problem solving of emerging strategic issues and op-
portunities. Furthermore, responsive innovation entails interactive learning, as periph-
eral learning is utilized to sense emerging issues, and central decision making activities 
are utilized to asses, prioritize and act upon the collective sensing of key stakeholders.  
Responsive innovation is different from the notion of dynamic capabilities in several 
ways: First, responsive innovation utilizes collective intelligence from both internal and 
external stakeholders to identify issues. Secondly, responsive innovation predominant-
ly focuses on making continuous incremental adjustments to its operational capabili-
ties (Wu et al., 2010). Hence, responsive innovation does not seek to radically change 
its operational capabilities – but instead to continuously adapt them to emerging is-
sues. Hence, responsive innovation differs from dynamic capabilities, by focusing on 
continuous incremental adjustments of the firm’s operational capabilities. Operational 
capabilities have been conceived as, “how you earn your living” (Zollo & Winter, 2002) 
and dynamic capabilities as “how you change your operational routines” (Helfat & Pe-
teraf, 2003; Winter, 2003).  
Unlike dynamic capabilities, responsive innovation does not seek to change the firm’s 
existing resource base or radically change its operational routines. Instead, the focus of 
responsive innovation is on ongoing improvements of existing operational capabilities 
and resources. However, many small adaptive innovations accumulated over time may 
add up to a significant change, in line with a dynamic capability rationale. Innovation 
focused on continuous change furthermore resonates with process philosophy, where 
innovation is equated with being in a perpetual state of motion.  
Similarly, responsive innovation differs from conventional approaches to strategic is-
sue diagnosis (SID) by (i) focusing on the innovative potential of issues (ii) and by utiliz-
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ing the collective sensing of key stakeholders for issue and opportunity identification. 
Hence, the utilization of aggregated experiental insights from around the organization-
al periphery should stimulate an underlying integrative strategy dynamic that can fos-
ter organizational adaptation and innovative responses. 
 
 
 
                      Figure 1: The position of responsive innovation 
 
The background of responsive innovation consists of an amalgam of literary streams 
concerning strategic issue diagnosis (Ansoff, 1975, 1980; Dutton and Duncan, 1987), 
collective sensing (Andersen, 2013; Surowiecki, 2004; Teece, 2007) and integrative 
strategy (Andersen, 2004, 2009, 2013; Burgelman and Grove, 1996, 2007; Grant, 2003; 
Hill et al., 2000). Each literary stream provides a piece to the underlying background of 
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responsive innovation. It similarly explicates the importance of focusing on the linkage 
between micro and macro levels in organizational adaptation.  
 
The key literary streams influencing the notion of responsive innovation are depicted 
below. The following will briefly explicate the essence of each of the three literary 
streams, and will furthermore highlight their relevance for the concept of responsive 
innovation. 
 
 
 
Strategic Issue Diagnosis 
Responsive innovation entails innovative responses to strategic issues that have been 
identified by the collective sensing of key stakeholders: According to Ansoff (1975, 
1980), a strategic issue is an event that has a significant performance impact on the 
firm. The domain subsumed by an ‘issue’ is likely to be broad, diffuse and ill-defined – 
particularly in its early stages (Dutton, Fahey & Narayanan, 1983).  
 
Hence, it is important to respond to weak signals in order to make a timely response 
(Ansoff, 1975, 1980). As noted by Ansoff (1975) “firms often fail to anticipate and sud-
denly discover that a fleeting opportunity has been missed or that survival of a product 
line is threatened. Typically, at the ‘moment of truth’ neither the causes nor the possi-
ble responses are clear; the firm confronts an unfamiliar and often threatening event” 
Figure 2: The Literary Streams underlying Responsive Innovation 
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(p. 22). Timely identification of issues constitutes an important strategic capability that 
should involve diverse points of view in the form of attentional triangulation.  
 
Put differently, strategic issue management constitutes a systematic approach for ear-
ly identification and fast responses to important issues. In order to make a timely re-
sponse, it is necessary to act early on weak signals, as illustrated below (Ansoff, 1980, 
p. 144): 
 
 
Figure 3: Interaction between forecasting horizon and response time 
 
The timeliness of firm responses is dependent on the interaction between the fore-
casting horizon and the time required by a firm to select and implement its response. 
The figure shows three different patterns, ranging from a slow event in curve A to a 
fast event in curve C. The vertical scale describes the state of knowledge about a 
change. The time of the event’s impact is essential, as this represents the time after 
which it is too late to respond (Ansoff, 1980). In case C, the firm’s response will be inef-
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ficient if it chooses to base its response on strong signals – therefore, weak signal de-
tection is necessary in hypercompetitive environments. Periodic planning is applicable 
for case A events, but in environments with many case C events, weak signal detection 
is necessary in order to make a timely response. However, the managerial processes 
surrounding the issue identification process may complicate managerial action (Dutton 
and Duncan, 1987). 
 
In a similar vein, several high-reliability firms have started to pay attention to what 
Holland (2002) calls ‘tiny initiating events’ or what Andriani and McKelvey (2009) con-
ceptualize as ‘butterfly-events’. Hence, complexity science stresses the importance of 
events that initially seem insignificant, but which may have an extreme impact in the 
near future. As described by Andriani and McKelvey (2009), positive feedback process-
es among interactive data points cause extreme events, as illustrated in Pareto distri-
butions. Thus, tiny initiating events create causal dynamics leading to non-linearity. 
The element of collective sensing constitutes a novel contribution to the strategic issue 
diagnosis literature: Responsive innovation utilizes collective intelligence (Malone et 
al., 2010) and the wisdom of crowds (Howe, 2008; Surowiecki, 2004) to identify emerg-
ing strategic issues. 
 
Collective Sensing from around the Organizational Periphery 
The strategies which have been developed by the central apex are enacted, effectuat-
ed and experienced by individuals around the organizational periphery. The enacted 
strategies come to life in the daily interactions among employees and between front-
line employees and customers. This suggests that frontline employees (Andersen, 
2013; Burgelman and Grove, 1996) and certain customers (Chesbrough, 2011; Chris-
tensen, Anthony & Roth, 2004; Christensen & Raynor, 2003; von Hippel, 1988, 1999, 
2005) often have updated and specific knowledge of the effects and developments of 
the chosen strategic trajectory.  Teece (2007) argues that an important part of the mi-
cro-foundations of dynamic capabilities lie in the sensing capabilities of lower-level 
employees.  
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As strategic planning has often separated thinking from doing (Mintzberg, 1994), expe-
rience-based learning has typically been ignored by the managerial top. This can force 
employees to create innovative initiatives that go against managerial orders i.e. crea-
tive deviance (Mainemelis, 2010). However, emergent strategies often happen in a 
more subtle manner, where action drives thinking. This is exemplified by Mintzberg 
(1987), who explain that, “Out in the field, a salesman visits a customer. The product 
isn’t quite right, and together they work out some modifications […] after two or three 
more rounds, they finally get it right. A new product emerges, which eventually opens 
up a new market. The company has changed strategic course” (p. 68).  
 
In a similar vein, Miller and Wedell-Wedellsborg (2013) make the case for stealth inno-
vation, by arguing that it is often a better strategy for lower-level employees to inno-
vate under the radar than going straight to the managerial top to obtain support for an 
innovation initiative: Going to the top can be a risky strategy for the employee, as the 
default answer is often ‘no’, and as the corporate spotlight can be a dangerous place 
for unproven ideas. According to Miller and Wedell-Wedellsborg (2013), a better alter-
native is to innovate under the radar, by appealing to managers one or two levels be-
low the C-suite; securing resources and creating proof of concept that will eventually 
be presented to a jury of executives (Miller and Wedell-Wedellsborg, 2013). Hence, 
the notion of stealth innovation resonates with concepts such as autonomous initia-
tives (Burgelman and Grove, 1996; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985) and creative deviance 
(Mainemelis, 2010). 
 
Teece (2007) refers to sensing as a unique firm capability that taps into changes in the 
firm’s surroundings. Consequently, frontline employees and customers should be able 
to collectively sense emerging issues. Hence, their collective sensing capabilities should 
be appropriate to include in innovation processes, as they can collectively sense 
emerging events that central management should subsequently act upon.   
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The rationale of relying on peripheral crowds is similarly explicated in the extensive lit-
erature on ‘the wisdom of crowds’ or collective intelligence. The wisdom of crowds, or 
collective intelligence, denotes the surprisingly accurate estimates that crowds can 
provide. As Surowiecki (2004) states, “under the right circumstances, groups are re-
markably intelligent, and are often smarter than the smartest people in them” 
(Surowiecki, 2004, p. xiii). The underlying logic of the wisdom of crowds posits that the 
independent judgment of a crowd of individuals will be relatively accurate. The hy-
pothesis is derived from mathematical principles which indicate that the crowd’s 
judgment comprises signal-plus-noise, and that the subsequent averaging across 
judgments will cancel out the noise while extracting the signal (Page, 2007; Hong & 
Page, 2011; Suroweicki, 2004). Consequently, “Collective wisdom, as we shall define it 
here, exists when the crowd outperforms the individuals that comprise it at a predic-
tive task” (Hong & Page, 2011, p. 2). Hence, the continuous aggregation of the sensing 
of peripheral crowds should provide accurate estimates of competitive conditions. 
 
Figure 4 juxtaposes peripheral learning with central learning: Where central learning is 
characterized by long feedback cycles of planning followed by an outcome, peripheral 
learning is characterized by relatively short feedback cycles entailing peripheral actions 
followed by immediate results (Andersen, 2013). Consequently, the experiential in-
sights learned around the organizational periphery should be more updated than those 
originating from the central apex. As noted by Andersen (2013), the two types of learn-
ing cycles should be combined within a system of interactive learning, which is in line 
with the underlying rationale of integrative strategy making. 
 
 
Figure 4: The rationale of interactive learning 
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Integrative Strategy 
A seminal discussion within strategic management concerns the extent to which strat-
egies evolve from lower-level ‘autonomous’ initiatives in the organization, as opposed 
to being initiated by the managerial top (Andersen, 2013; Bower & Gilbert, 2007; 
Burgelman & Grove, 1996, 2007; Mintzberg, 1987, 1990a, 1990b, 1994; Mintzberg & 
Waters, 1985). For example, some studies question whether strategy is a coherent 
plan conceived at the top, or if it is formed by a stream of individual commitments, not 
always in line with the plans of the top management team (Bower and Gilbert, 2007; 
Burgelman and Grove, 1996, 2007; Miller and Wedell-Wedellsborg, 2013; Mintzberg, 
1987; Mintzberg and Waters, 1985).  
 
However, there are strong arguments for both a designed top-down driven strategy 
and bottom-up approaches of an emergent character. However, reality is most likely 
comprised by a complex interrelationship between the two, resembling the time-
bound swings of a pendulum that intricately interweave central and peripheral pro-
cesses over time (Andersen, 2013; Bower and Gilbert, 2007; Burgelman and Grove, 
1996; Grant, 2003; Mintzberg, 1994). Hence, a practical reality entailing both central 
top-down planning of intended strategies and peripheral bottom-up effectuation that 
may foster emergent strategies and innovative initiatives has long been propagated 
(Andersen & Minbaeva, 2013; Mainemelis, 2010; Mintzberg, 1987, 1990a, 1994; 
Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; Stacey, 1995). The combination is not only the most accu-
rate, but it has been shown to provide superior performance outcomes (Andersen, 
2013). Thus, complex strategy comprises longterm planning and everyday actions. 
 
Central and peripheral processes may be complimentary within corporate strategy, or-
ganizational learning and innovation, as they together form an organizational response 
capability that can overcome the tension between exploitation and exploration: The 
necessity of combining central and peripheral processes has long been highlighted, but 
often in slightly different ways (Andersen & Fredens, 2011, 2013; Bower and Gilbert, 
2007; Burgelman & Grove, 1996, 2007; Grant, 2003; Mintzberg & Waters, 1985).  
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For instance, Andersen and Fredens (2011, 2013) argue that corporate entrepreneur-
ship and strategic renewal derive from complimentary central and peripheral process-
es. In a similar vein, Mintzberg and Waters (1985) have explicated how real-world 
strategies lie on a continuum between deliberate and emergent – and that a mutual 
interplay between the two poles is the most common. Similarly, Burgelman and Grove 
(2007) propose that corporate longevity depends on matching cycles of autonomous 
and induced strategy processes to different forms of strategic dynamics, and that the 
role of strategic leadership is to balance the induced and autonomous processes.  
 
However, Grant (2003) sees planned emergence as a process in which strategic plan-
ning systems provide a mechanism for coordinating decentralized strategy formulation 
within a structure of demanding performance targets and clear corporate guidelines. 
Finally, Burgelman and Doz (2001) argue that long-term success in maximizing profita-
ble growth requires developing new strategy-making capabilities, i.e. complex strategic 
integration (CSI), which make leaders able to identify the maximum-strategic-
opportunity set. This refers to those opportunities that can let companies fully exploit 
both their capabilities and their potential to pursue new strategies (Burgelman and 
Doz, 2001). 
 
3. THE CONTOURS OF RESPONSIVE INNOVATION 
A synthesis of the main arguments from the preceding review can draw up the con-
tours of responsive innovation. Responsive innovation represents an approach to in-
novation that centers around peripheral sensing of strategic issues and minor initiating 
events: If it is acknowledged  (i) that central and decentralized processes should be 
aligned in order to foster interactive learning and develop an organizational response 
capability (Andersen, 2004, 2013; Andersen & Fredens, 2011, 2013; Andersen & Niel-
sen, 2004; Burgelman and Doz, 2001; Burgelman & Grove, 1996, 2007; Grant, 2003) (ii) 
that lower-level employees and customers have strategically important knowledge 
that is qualitatively different than that of central managers (Burgelman and Grove, 
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1996, 2007;; von Hippel, 1988, 1999, 2005) (iii) and that collective intelligence may 
lead to more accurate decisions (Howe, 2008; Surowiecki, 2004), then each of the ar-
guments may be integrated. By incorporating collective sensing into the process of 
strategic issue diagnosis (Ansoff, 1975, 1980; Dutton, Fahey & Narayanan, 1983; Dut-
ton & Duncan, 1987), the integrative strategy approach could foster innovation.  
 
The figure below illustrates a framework describing the uses of crowds for innovation 
and decision making. The conventional uses of collective intelligence of customers and 
employees in innovation and decision making have typically revolved around:  (i) Man-
agement identifying an issue and framing it as a task. (ii) The peripheral crowd solving 
the posed task. In contrast, responsive innovation reverses the conventional uses of 
crowds. Responsive innovation entails: (i) The peripheral crowd identifying issues, op-
portunities and tiny initiating events. (ii) Management responding to the identified is-
sues, typically by exploring existing or novel ideas inside or outside the organization. 
 
 
Figure 5: The model of Responsive Innovation 
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As it is apparent in the figure, the traditional use of collective wisdom in the innovation 
process is represented by quadrant 1 and 4: Typically, management identifies a specific 
issue and frames it as a task, and then they make use of the collective intelligence of 
an external or internal crowd to solve the posed task (Howe, 2008; King & Lakhani, 
2013; Surowiecki, 2004). Examples of this practice are seen in Google’s use of predic-
tion markets for employees (Cowgil et al., 2009) and Threadless’ business model for 
leveraging crowds (Chesbrough, 2011). Albeit this approach has proven its usefulness 
(Howe, 2008; Luckner et al., 2012; Suroweicki, 2004), it is argued that the approach on-
ly represents a very narrow use of the innovative potential of collective intelligence in 
peripheral crowds.  
In contrast, quadrant 2 and 3 in figure 3 illustrates the basic elements of responsive in-
novation: Here, collective intelligence and aggregated sensing of the peripheral crowd 
is utilized to find emerging issues that central management will subsequently seek to 
resolve. As frontline employees (Andersen, 2013), certain users (von Hippel, 1988, 
2005) and certain customers (Christensen, Anthony & Roth, 2004) have been charac-
terized as being at the forefront of novel developments, it would be logical to rely on 
their collective sensing of internal and external changes.  
 
However, it is essential to emphasize that managerial issue responses do not require 
that managers themselves imagine solutions to emerging problems: As it has previous-
ly been propagated by Burgelman and Grove (1996, 2007), top management typically 
struggles to come up with solutions when facing emerging crises.  
 
Hence, the notion of managerial issue responses rather entails that management takes 
responsibility of the emerging issue, and seeks to discover an existing or novel solution 
inside or outside the walls of the organization (Burgelman & Grove, 1996), by engaging 
in interactive discussions (Simons, 1990, 1991, 1994, 1995) or initiating crowdsourcing 
initiatives (Howe, 2008). 
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4. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, the concept of responsive innovation has been introduced as a strategic 
innovation model that incorporates the collective sensing of key stakeholders. The 
model provides the contours for an approach to innovation that emphasizes respon-
siveness to volatile settings. In particular, it has been proposed that key stakeholders 
operating around the organizational periphery can collectively sense internal and ex-
ternal issues, and that central management should continuously aggregate, diagnose 
and act upon their insights. Hence, the innovation model builds on integrative strategy, 
collective sensing and strategic issue diagnosis.  
 
5. LIMITATIONS AND A RESEARCH AGENDA 
While the concept and framework of responsive innovation make several theoretical 
contributions, it is evident that future research should explore the verisimilitude of the 
conceptualized model in empirical studies entailing both qualitative and quantitative 
data. This not only meets the need to empirically validate the developed framework, it 
can also provide in-depth explanations of the concepts entailed within responsive in-
novation. Here, it would be relevant to investigate the industries where responsive in-
novation holds the most promise. It is clear that responsive innovation should be ap-
propriate for high-velocity environments, but is the approach mostly applicable to ser-
vice industries, due to its emphasis on frontline employees and customers? Or does 
the recent servitization trend similarly make it valuable for manufacturing companies? 
These are questions that call for empirical answers. 
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